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The Federal Reserve’s announcement in May 2013 that it would at some point commence 
tapering prompted a bout of instability on Latin American financial markets and on 
emerging markets in general, which was followed from September by a period of some 
stability and recovery. Indeed, the actual start of tapering in December was digested with 
relative calm by the markets. However, early 2014 saw some intermittent episodes of 
tension, one with its epicentre in Argentina, which have affected the emerging economies 
with differing degrees of intensity, depending on their vulnerabilities and idiosyncrasies 
(less so in the case of those countries whose economic policies had already reacted during 
the mid-2013 episode). Significantly, in any event, the change in outlook for the monetary 
cycle in the United States comes in step with the firming of the recovery in this country 
and, with a greater lag, in other advanced economies, a recovery which is a favourable 
factor for the region. Nonetheless, the main concern over Latin America appears to be 
shifting more recently from the tightening of global monetary conditions to the risk that 
China may slow down more than expected. 
Against this background of weaker commodities prices, and with the output gap having 
closed in some of the region’s main economies, the second half of 2013 saw a slowdown 
in activity in Latin America. Average GDP across the five countries with inflation targets 
(excluding Argentina and Venezuela1) dipped from year-on-year growth of 3% in Q2 to 2% 
in Q4. As a result, GDP in these five economies as a whole grew by 2.3% in 2013, down 
on the previous year’s figure of 2.9% and on the expectations of recovery that prevailed at 
the start of the year. Moreover, this weakness has been spreading to more countries: in 
2012, only Argentina and Brazil showed lower growth rates, influenced by domestic 
factors; in 2013, the slowdown has progressively passed through to other countries, such 
as Venezuela, Mexico and also Chile. In any event, Chile, along with Colombia and Peru, 
has maintained growth far above the average.
While there are a wide range of different circumstances across the region’s countries, one 
common feature in the recent slowdown has been the easing in domestic demand. This 
variable, having exceeded on average year-on-year growth of 3.5% in the first half of 
2013, posted growth of only 1.2% in Q4, owing to the slowdown in Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico (see Chart 1). Conversely, external demand began to pick up in some economies 
in the final stretch of the year, although its contribution is as yet modest, in line with the 
slow recovery in the developed economies; indeed, in 2013 as a whole, it continued to 
subtract from growth. In addition, the slowdown in GDP has become more marked in 
Argentina and Venezuela as a result of specific factors in these countries, with significant 
risks building up. 
The growth outlook for Latin America for 2014 has continued to be revised downwards in 
recent months. On average, growth similar to and even slightly lower than that in 2013 is 
expected, with notable intra-regional differences. On one hand, Peru, Colombia and, to 
Introduction
1  At the cut-off date for this publication, Argentina and Venezuela had not released the National Accounts data for 
2013 Q4; accordingly, it has not been possible to compile the LatAm-7 aggregate of the region’s seven main 
countries, as was the habitual practice. Alternatively, a LatAm-5 aggregate comprising Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, 
Peru and Chile has been constructed so that recent growth in the region may be analysed and comparisons 
made with previous quarters.
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a lesser extent, Chile are expected to remain soundly buoyant, although possibly less 
intensely so than in previous years. In Mexico the outlook is favourable since temporary 
factors, which were responsible for the slowdown in 2013, are expected to gradually fade 
over the course of the year; moreover, current reforms are also expected to boost 
confidence. The Brazilian economy, for its part, appears to have settled into a low growth 
rate which, viewed positively, may contribute partially to correcting its external imbalances 
and to shoring up its growth in the medium term, conditional upon the path of reforms 
being furthered. Finally, Venezuela and Argentina are expected to enter a low growth 
phase, with the risk of recession with high inflation. 
In the countries with inflation targets, inflationary pressures appear to be manageable and 
expectations remain anchored. There are, however, upside risks derived from currency 
depreciations (in some cases substantial) and from the increase in food prices, which 
might offset the moderating effect of domestic demand and compound economic policy 
dilemmas. Some countries retain the capacity to pursue countercyclical policies, such as 
Peru, Colombia, Mexico and Chile which, in the absence of inflationary pressures, have 
been able to keep their policies accommodative and to assume the depreciation of their 
currencies. In Brazil, however, this leeway seems more limited at present owing to 
persistent inflation. In Argentina and Venezuela, inflationary pressures have worsened 
substantially and, although their respective economic policy responses are proving 
different, both economies face a series of macroeconomic constraints, singularly so in 
terms of forgone reserves, which obviate the application of countercyclical policies. 
The year 2014 poses uncertainties for Latin America. The positive impact on the region of 
the recovery under way in the US economy, in the specific form of greater external demand 
(see Chart 1), may be offset to a greater or lesser extent by the tightening of financing 
conditions, and something of a slowdown in certain emerging economies. One factor of 
risk is the possibility that the easing in activity in China proves sharper than expected, 
which would have a greater impact on the countries more exposed to this economy and in 
which the presence of macroeconomic imbalances curtails the margin for manoeuvre of 
economic policy. Overall, it will seemingly be difficult for the region to recover the forceful 
dynamism it showed in exiting the Great Recession. Moreover, 2014 will provide a chance 
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to see whether the cumulative depreciation of the exchange rate is sufficient to 
accommodate these external shocks, and to what extent it will restrict monetary policy 
leeway in the future. How Venezuela and Argentina will manage a situation of low growth 
with major imbalances is another sizeable factor of uncertainty. All these developments 
highlight the importance of reinforcing economic policy frameworks and prioritising 
competitiveness-enhancing structural reforms. 
Developments in the world economy in the past six months have continued to be influenced 
by two key factors: first, the slowdown in various emerging economies, in general, and 
doubts over the sustainability of the pace of growth in China, in particular; and further, 
expectations about the normalisation of the monetary cycle in the United States. Following 
a recovery on the financial markets at year-end, underpinned by the clarification of the US 
monetary strategy and by increasingly widespread signs of a pick-up in the advanced 
economies, there were temporary episodes of tension in the emerging financial markets in 
2014 Q1 which highlight the persistence of doubts over the position of certain emerging 
economies that may have built up excessive imbalances. 
Against this backdrop, global activity quickened in the second half of 2013 to rates of 
around 3.5% (see Chart 2), 1 pp up on the first half of the year, as a result of the firming of 
the recovery in the advanced economies; accordingly, the ongoing shift in global growth 
towards this group of economies continued. True, the latest data point to some easing in 
the growth of the advanced economies in early 2014, owing to temporary factors (such as 
the bad weather in the United States). But they are expected to continue strengthening, in 
a setting of smaller fiscal adjustments than in 2013 (except in Japan), favourable monetary 
and financial conditions (despite the tightening), gradual recovery in real estate and labour 
markets, and an increase in private-sector wealth. With the exception of Japan, inflation 
trended downwards in this group of economies, which can in certain cases cause concern, 
as in the euro area (0.5% in March). The monetary authorities in these countries face a 
divergent outlook; while some, such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England, are 
managing the change in monetary cycle with successive alterations to their forward 
guidance strategies, others such as the Bank of Japan or the ECB are assessing the 
possibility of providing greater stimuli. The balance of risks for the advanced economies 
has improved, with the increase in risks associated with low inflation rates standing out. 
In the second half of 2013 the growth rate of the emerging economies generally stood 
below expectations, with the pace of growth across the different regions remaining mixed. 
In 2013 on average, China grew by 7.7%, the rest of Emerging Asia by 4.4% and Eastern 
Europe by 1.3%, while Latin America was in an intermediate position (2.3%). The worsening 
outlook for the emerging economies has continued in 2014 to date. While for this year 
growth is expected to stabilise at similar rates to those in 2013, there are downside risks 
with this scenario, arising from the potential re-emergence of episodes of financial volatility 
and from their impact on investors’ and agents confidence, and from a sharper-than-
expected slowdown in China. These risks are more material for the economies with weaker 
fundamentals. However, significant exceptions aside, it should be clarified that the 
imbalances built up recently by these economies have been moderate; also, levels of 
vulnerability are lower than in the past, given the greater soundness of their macroeconomic 
policy frameworks, the solvency of their banking systems and the presence of mitigation 
mechanisms, such as the absorption capacity generated by exchange-rate flexibility – 
against a background of fewer currency mismatches – and the high level of reserves in 
many of these countries. In any event, greater market sensitivity has in certain cases 
restricted the headroom available for countercyclical policies. 
External environment
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In the final quarter of 2013, the financial indicators of the emerging economies were 
characterised by a stock market recovery and a downtrend in spreads and in default risk 
premia (see Chart 2). Stock markets regained the levels prior to the turbulence in May, 
while sovereign spreads, measured by the EMBI index, stabilised at some 70 bp above the 
levels observed in the first half of 2013. Exchange rates picked up to levels close to those 
seen in May, except those of the more vulnerable economies, which continued to show an 
8-10% depreciation against the dollar. 
In early 2014, in the new setting of gradually normalising global monetary conditions, 
developments in the emerging markets came to depend to a greater extent on idiosyncratic 
factors, economic and political alike. In light of the earlier-mentioned doubts over the 
outlook for China, the political tensions in Turkey and the weakness of this country’s 
external sector, coupled with the strong and swift depreciation of the Argentine peso, gave 
rise to fresh turbulence in late January which was relatively widespread but more fleeting 
in nature than the episode in 2013 (see Chart 3). This turbulence had less of an impact on 
economies whose economic policies had already reacted in 2013, such as Brazil, Indonesia 
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and India, although a further factor of weight in this lesser reaction was the intensity of the 
cumulative depreciation of exchange rates. Subsequently, events in Ukraine renewed 
tensions, although the impact was more regional in nature, chiefly affecting the Eastern 
European countries and Turkey. Moreover, low financial volatility globally and low long-
term yields in the United States restricted the spread of these bouts of turbulence (see 
Chart 2). By late March, the financial indicators of the emerging markets had recovered, in 
particular in those countries most affected by the turbulence in May. Nonetheless, investor 
sentiment towards the emerging markets is now generally less favourable than a year ago, 
in a setting in which doubts persist over economic activity and the financial sector in 
China, with possible repercussions for the external demand of the emerging economies 
and commodities prices. 
In parallel, the past six months have seen a withdrawal by minority investors from the 
emerging markets in the form of heavy outflows from debt funds and stock markets (see 
Chart 3), based on the surveys habitually used. Moreover, balance of payments figures 
point to a slowdown in portfolio inflows. Bond issues across the emerging economies as a 
whole once again reached historical highs between December and January, but a 
slowdown has since been perceptible. Against a background of expectations of lower 
global liquidity and interest rate rises, fixed-income issues are likely to be geared to a 
greater proportion towards asset-backed and variable-yield issues with shorter maturities 
and, possibly, with a higher average rating. These characteristics began to become 
discernible as from the third or fourth quarter of 2013, albeit incipiently (see Chart 3). 
The performance of the Latin-American financial markets was similar to that of the other 
emerging markets, with the odd particularity suggesting a degree of intra-regional 
discrimination. Stock markets fell very sharply from end-September to early 2014 
(especially in Brazil and Chile, although Mexico performed favourably), with indices picking 
up subsequently. As a result, from October 2013 to March 2014 Latin American stock 
markets posted an average fall of 1.3%, compared with the 3% increase on Asian bourses. 
This was marked by the declines in Brazil (-2.6%) and Peru (-9.6%); in Mexico, the decline 
was smaller (-1%) owing to the greater correlation with US markets and improved 
expectations on the back of Mexico’s structural reforms. 
Sovereign spreads in the Latin American countries were relatively stable until the 
January-February episode of turbulence, when they widened somewhat, although this 
movement was reversed in late March (see Chart 4). Sovereign risk premia, measured by 
the Latin American EMBI, stood from late March at somewhat below 400 bp for the 
region, close to the average for the past four years. These developments were influenced 
by the behaviour of the Argentine sovereign spread (which narrowed by 170 bp from 
mid-October further to the post-election shift in the economic policy stance), and were 
offset in part by the increase in Venezuela (100 bp). Overall, the recent decline in the 
EMBI Latin America has been on a lesser scale than that in other emerging regions 
(15 bp since mid-October, compared with 40 bp in Asia), and with some differences from 
country to country. The stability of sovereign spreads has been compatible with a 
substantial increase in local currency-denominated long-term bond yields since late May 
2013 although, once again, differences across countries have been significant (increases 
of almost 3 pp in Brazil, 1.7 pp in Mexico and unchanged in Chile; see Chart 4). The 
behaviour of spreads has been similar to that of CDS premia, which have over the past 
18 months re-adjusted in step with the greater perception of risk in this region and in 
other emerging regions, and the reverse of what has been observed in the developed 
economies, as is analysed in Box 1. 
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The exchange rates of the region’s currencies held on a mild depreciating trend over the 
last six months. The exception was the Mexican peso, which appreciated by 0.8% from 
October. The cumulative depreciation against the dollar was more marked in the case, 
first, of the Brazilian real (-2%), despite intervention by the country’s central bank on the 
currency markets and the successive rises in the official interest rate; and further, of the 
SOVEREIGN SPREADS, EXCHANGE RATES, BOND ISSUES AND FUND FLOWS  
Percentages, basis points and $bn  
CHART 3
SOURCES: Datastream, Dealogic, EPFR and national statistics. 
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currencies of the economies more closely tied to commodities prices, such as Chile 
(-8.8%) and Colombia (-3.2%). In some instances, the depreciations recorded since 
May 2013 have enabled the prior appreciation of the real exchange rate to be corrected 
(see Chart 4). 
Finally, despite the bleaker growth outlook, there was a firm inflow of high foreign direct 
investment into the Latin American economies in 2013 ($163 billion, $8.7 billion up on 
2012; see Chart 5). There were notable inflows in Mexico, which broke the declining trend 
evident since the crisis of 2008, along with an increase in Colombia and a recovery in 
Venezuela, in the oil sector. Conversely, Brazil, Peru and Chile recorded lower inflows, 
although they were at historically high levels. Portfolio investment inflows fell by around 
$30 billion in 2013, to levels similar to those in 2011 (see Chart 5), with the decline centred 
on Mexico and Chile in the second quarter of the year. From October 2013 to March 2014, 
fixed-income issues in the region amounted to $60 billion, with notable issuance activity in 
Mexico by both the Treasury – with short-term debt refinancing operations and very long-
term currency-denominated issues – and the State-owned oil corporation (23% of the total 
between the two), and an $8.5 billion placement by the Brazilian State-owned oil 
corporation (see Chart 5). 
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BOX 1DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE BETWEEN AGENCY RATINGS AND THE RATINGS IMPLIED
BY SOVEREIGN CDSs
After the 2008 global financial crisis there was a notable change in 
the perception of risk across the main developed and emerging 
markets, which has reversed partially in the last year and a half. 
These changes in perceptions are reflected both in the sovereign 
ratings issued by credit rating agencies and in certain market 
indicators, such as credit default swaps (CDSs). However the 
rightward shift of the curves of CDS premia versus sovereign 
ratings shows that the risk measured by CDSs has increased 
notably for the same level of rating (see panel 1 of Chart 1). 
Moreover, the dispersion between the ratings assigned by 
agencies and those implied by CDSs has also increased.
This Box analyses the relationship between the sovereign ratings 
issued by Standard & Poor´s and the ratings implied by CDSs, 
which are derived from a regression of the agency-issued rating on 
the level of default premia in CDS markets. In the charts, upward 
movements in these two variables denote lower credit risk.
Panel 1 of Chart 1 shows the convergence of credit risk between 
advanced and emerging economies (the former influenced by the 
deterioration in the euro area), measured in terms of implied 
ratings and of agency-issued ratings. Also apparent is a clear 
divergence between the agency-issued ratings and the risk 
perceived by the markets at certain points in time, particularly 
from 2010, after the outbreak of the euro crisis. At that time, in the 
euro area economies under high financial stress the credit risk 
implied by CDSs increased notably, at a level well below the rating 
assigned by credit rating agencies. By contrast, in the aggregate 
of emerging economies the credit risk implied by CDSs was lower 
than that indicated by agency-issued ratings. The situation began 
to change at the end of the summer of 2012. First, the reduction of 
extreme risks in the euro area was reflected in an improvement in 
its implied ratings, which are now again above those assigned by 
agencies. The improvement again centred on the countries most 
affected by the crisis and, for some of them, such as Spain, the 
discounted rating in March 2014 stood two notches above that 
assigned by the rating agency. By contrast, the worsening 
perception of the emerging economies, particularly from May 2013 
with the change in monetary policy stance in the United States, led 
to a revision of their credit risk, such that now the rating implied by 
sovereign CDS premia is BBB, two notches below that of the 
rating agency. The worsening of the implied sovereign rating was 
most marked in emerging Asia (as much as two notches below the 
agency-assigned level), while in eastern Europe the implied ratings 
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BOX 1DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE BETWEEN AGENCY RATINGS AND THE RATINGS IMPLIED
BY SOVEREIGN CDSs (cont’d)
SOURCES: Standard & Poor’s and Banco de España. 
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BOX 1DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE BETWEEN AGENCY RATINGS AND THE RATINGS IMPLIED
BY SOVEREIGN CDSs (cont’d)
remained in line with agency-issued ratings until February 2014, 
when the Ukraine crisis triggered a sharp rise in CDSs and a fall in 
the ratings discounted.
In Latin America (see panel 3 of Chart 1) there was a sharp 
discrepancy between the rating implied by CDSs and that assigned 
by agencies, amounting to more than three notches, which the 
gradual improvement in the latter has not sufficed to offset. 
However, the rise in CDS premia from mid-2012 caused the two 
measures to converge towards a BBB– rating. Examination by 
country shows that the implied rating of Brazil decreased sharply 
from the beginning of 2012 in an earlier and larger fall than the 
effective downgrade finally made at the end of March (see panel 2 
of Chart 2). Recently there have also been declines in the implied 
sovereign ratings of Colombia, Peru and Chile, which had enjoyed 
recent upgrades in the sovereign rating assigned by Standard and 
Poor’s. By contrast, in Mexico the CDS-implied ratings continue to 
be higher than agency-assigned ratings, even after the recent 
upgrade of the assigned rating (see panel 1 of Chart 2),1 which 
reflects a perception of lower vulnerability than in the rest of the 
region. Finally, for Argentina and Venezuela (countries with a worse 
agency-assigned rating), the implied rating is even lower, reflecting 
a higher level of default risk than that perceived by the rating 
agency. The implied rating of Uruguay slipped by less than those 
of other economies in the region (see panel 6 of Chart 2) and is 
currently in line with that of the rating agency, just on the threshold 
of investment grade (BBB–).
The perception of credit risk is strongly correlated with the 
behaviour of capital flows and issuance volume in the primary 
corporate bond markets. Chart 3 sets out the portfolio inflows and 
corporate issues in primary markets for various groups of 
countries: emerging economies with higher vulnerability (Turkey, 
Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Russia); the more stable 
emerging economies (Mexico, Korea and Poland); and the euro 
area countries under financial stress (Italy, Portugal, Ireland and 
Spain). As can be seen, at the same time as portfolio inflows 
slowed and issues slackened in the first group, those of the 
second remained relatively stable, while those of the European 
economies recovered strongly, albeit without recouping their pre-
crisis levels.
In short, analysis of the ratings implied by the sovereign CDS 
markets and their comparison with those issued by agencies 
reveals information of interest on the behaviour of investors and 
their perceptions of the countries in question. Since agency-
issued ratings change much more slowly, the implied ratings may 
in some cases anticipate agencies’ revisions and lend firmness to 
the perception of greater or lesser risk. Nevertheless, the volatility 
of implied ratings also shows the variable, oscillatory nature of 
market sentiment. Specifically, the positive divergence of implied 
ratings in emerging economies following the crisis may reflect an 
over-reaction in favour of these markets, which has been corrected 
recently. Another interesting conclusion is that a certain 
substitutability can be appreciated between emerging economies 
and the euro area countries under stress: the dissipation of tail 
risks in the latter, simultaneously with the perception of greater 
vulnerability in the emerging economies as changes were made to 
US monetary policy has prompted opposing developments which 
are mirrored in capital flows: these now target the emerging 
economies to a lesser extent and are returning to the euro 
economies, in a trend which is reversing that of previous years.
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1  Somewhat similar to the situation for South Korea, Poland and Hungary.
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The Latin American economies2 were unable to entrench in the second half of 2013 the 
incipient recovery discernible at mid-year (see Chart 6 and Table 1). Following relatively weak 
quarter-on-quarter growth in the third and fourth quarters, average GDP in the region slowed 
from 3.5% year-on-year in Q2 to 2% in Q4. Notwithstanding this widespread easing in activity, 
results continued to be notably mixed across the region. Activity in Colombia and Peru, with 
annual growth of 4.3% and 5%, respectively, was much sounder than the average, especially 
in the second half of the year when Colombia posted growth rates higher than those observed 
in 2012. Chile, whose economy had been mildly slowing, dipped surprisingly in Q4 with a 
decline in terms of the quarterly rate that took its year-on-year growth to 2.7% at the end of the 
year. Both Mexico (with meagre growth of 1.1% for the year and 0.7% year-on-year in Q4) and 
Brazil (which posted annual growth of 2.3% in 2013 and of 1.9% in Q4) showed a clearer 
easing in their growth rates, although Brazil held up better than expected in the final stretch of 
the year. Argentina and Venezuela, meanwhile, saw activity grind to a halt in a setting in which, 
despite the differences in economic policy responses, the underlying situation (worsening 
public finances, overvaluation of the real exchange rate, exchange rate pressures and the 
tailing off of international currency reserves) appear to make adjustment inevitable. 
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In terms of components, the main determinant of the easing in growth in the second half of 
2013 was the sluggishness of domestic demand, which marks a significant difference from 
the composition of growth in recent years (see Chart 7). Although the path of year-on-year 
growth see-sawed during 2013, the buoyancy of domestic demand tended to soften 
towards a year-on-year rate close to 1% in 2013 Q4, 2 pp below that at the start of the year. 
In contrast, external demand ceased to contribute negatively to growth, posting a positive 
contribution (+0.8 pp) as from Q4, against a backdrop of gradually improving exports and 
the diminishing momentum of imports. This may be an incipient sign of re-balancing in the 
region’s sources of growth, with a less expansionary contribution of domestic demand 
relative to recent years and a more positive contribution by the external sector. 
The slowdown in domestic demand originated in the weakening in gross capital formation 
(see Chart 7) which, after rising in the region on average to a year-on-year rate of 5.5% in 
Q2, failed to firm and ended the year growing at a year-on-year rate of 1.5%, albeit with 
significant dispersion from country to country. In Mexico and Chile, investment fell to year-
on-year rates of -3% and -12.7%, respectively (with a significant temporary component in 
Mexico, and unexpectedly in Chile), and in Peru it slowed abruptly to 1.2% year-on-year, 
down from 9.5% in Q2. However, in Brazil, where investment had languished in 2012, there 
was a recovery which was sharper mid-year (9.1% year-on-year in Q2) and somewhat 
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SOURCE: National statistics.
a Latin America 7: the seven countries represented. Latin America 5: except Argentina and Venezuela.
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more moderate thereafter (5.5% year-on-year in Q4). In Colombia, investment, after 
commencing mildly in 2013, rose forcefully to 8% at the end of the year. 
Over the region as a whole, the driving force of domestic demand continued to be private 
consumption (see Chart 7). This variable maintained a robust growth rate, thanks to the 
continuing soundness of labour markets, since the unemployment rate ended 2013 at 
6.1% of the labour force, around its historical low. Despite this, job creation tended to ease 
(see Chart 8), in line with events in 2012, and other determinants of consumption, such as 
wages and credit, posted lower growth than that previously observed. This may explain 
why, in countries such as Brazil and Mexico, an appreciable slowdown in private 
consumption has been witnessed, to year-on-year rates of 1.9% and 1.5%, respectively, 
in Q4. Finally, government consumption held at a high rate of increase in most countries in 
the region, especially in the most dynamic economies, such as Colombia, Peru and Chile, 
where it exceeded the growth of the two previous years. 
As to external demand, exports were notably and increasingly buoyant in the second 
half of 2013, posting growth of 5.6% year-on-year in Q4. In Mexico and Peru, exports 
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grew by 6.7% and 3.1%, respectively, in Q4 following the collapse in Q1, and in Brazil 
there was a slight recovery over 2013 as a whole (2.5%), after the slackness shown in 
2012. Conversely, exports in Chile ground to an abrupt halt in Q4 after growing by 11% 
in Q3. Imports lost notable momentum in the final stretch of 2013, declining from a 
year-on-year rate of 7.3% in Q3 to 2.3% in Q4, dragged down by the slowdown in gross 
capital formation and, possibly, by the widespread depreciation of exchange rates in 
the region too. 
The high-frequency indicators point to continuing weakness in early 2014, but with 
divergences from country to country. Thus, while certain coincident indicators of activity 
and industrial output were growing at a sound pace in Brazil, they were easing to some 
degree in Peru and Chile, with signs of slackness of external demand bearing negatively 
on the productive activity of the export sector. On the demand side, retail sales proved 
notably dynamic in January, although the signs in February are mixed, with declines in 
both the business and consumer confidence indices, in Brazil, and a more positive trend 
in Mexico and Peru. Argentina and Venezuela are witnessing a collapse in confidence 
indicators, which might augur a decline in activity. 
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On the external front, the trade surplus continued to narrow to 0.8% of regional GDP, less 
than half the figure in 2012, stabilising in Q4. This stabilisation is due to a resurgence in 
exports by the biggest economies in the region, Brazil and Mexico, a development that 
contrasts with the year-on-year decline experienced by other major exporters of 
commodities, such as Chile, Colombia and Peru. Imports, meanwhile, quickened to 2013 
Q3, easing in Q4 and thus providing for the stabilisation of the trade surplus. Country by 
country, the reduction in the surplus was most marked in South America and in the 
commodities-exporting countries, except in Chile, where it improved owing to the decline 
in imports, linked to the sluggishness of investment. 
Despite this stabilisation in the trade surplus in the closing months of the year, the current 
account deficit continued to widen in the region on the whole (see Chart 9). It stood at 2.5% of 
GDP in Q4, the highest figure of the past decade. The protracted worsening in the Brazilian 
current account deficit was of note (-3.6% of GDP), as was that of Peru (-4.9%) and Mexico 
(-1.7%), prompted by the forgone revenue from remittances and the increase in investment 
income payments. In the remaining countries, the deficit held stable, and even fell slightly in 
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Chile to -3.4% of GDP. Generally, the financing of current account deficits have been mostly 
covered with foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, which have sustained a good pace over the 
year; however, in some cases such as Brazil and Peru the coverage ratio has worsened in the 
face of the strong expansion of the deficit and some easing in FDI. Finally, in Venezuela and 
Argentina the strong appreciation of the exchange rate and the contraction in activity are also 
expected to have checked real imports, but to have made their value soar, while exports have 
also declined, with the subsequent worsening of these countries’ respective current accounts. 
In the five countries with inflation targets (which involves excluding Argentina and Venezuela 
again), year-on-year inflation rose slightly from 4.4% to 4.6% from September to March 
(see Chart 10). There was a relatively widespread uptrend in consumer prices, especially in 
early 2014, partly as a result of rising food prices and the depreciation of exchange rates. 
In Brazil, despite the fact that inflation was easing, the rate remains the highest of the five 
countries in question and has recently risen further (6.2% year-on-year in March). In any 
event, the main tensions and risks are centred on Venezuela and Argentina, where inflation 
stood in February at rates of 53% year-on-year and 3.4% month-on-month, respectively.3
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The inflation outlook differs from country to country. In Brazil, prices continue to show 
downward stickiness and expectations have held in the upper part of the target range, 
despite the weakness of growth and the tightening of monetary policy in the past year 
(see Table 2). The depreciation of the exchange rate, the rise in food prices and the risk 
of a hike in energy prices, given the prevailing drought, might continue hampering price 
moderation. In Chile, too, the depreciation of the exchange rate might impose greater 
pressure on prices in the short run. In Colombia, inflation is expected to continue 
increasing mildly until stabilising around the central bank’s target level, after having stood 
temporarily in the lower part of the band in late 2013. In Peru and Mexico, the recent rise 
appears to be due to a greater extent to temporary supply-side factors, whereby a change 
in direction may be expected in the coming quarters. In all cases, the cumulative exchange 
rate depreciation introduces the main upside risk, although pass-through is limited and 
second-round effects are not observed. 
Monetary policy responses have also differed. In Brazil, the monetary authority extended 
the contraction in the phase of its policy, initiated on April 2013, with further rises in the 
official interest rate from October to April, up to 11%. At the other extreme, the Chilean 
central bank initiated an expansionary cycle last October, in response to the slowdown in 
activity, making four cuts to lower the rate to 4%. Peru has also shown an expansionary 
bias: after the unexpected 25 bp cut in November, the official interest rate held at 4%, but 
the central bank has continued reducing local-currency-denominated bank reserves, 
seeking to counter the absorption of liquidity in local currency arising from the intervention 
on foreign exchange markets to contain the depreciation. In the remaining countries, the 
stance was accommodative: Mexico has kept its official rate at 3.5% following the 25 bp 
cut in October, while the official rate in Colombia has now stood at 3.25% for a year. 
In the foreign exchange realm, the authorities have continued allowing currencies to 
depreciate in 2013 Q4 and in 2014 to date, although the depreciation has generally been 
less sharp than during the episode last summer. Mexico and Chile did not intervene on the 
foreign exchange markets; however, in other countries the monetary authorities have 
intervened to temper the depreciation and prevent excessive volatility, with possible 
unwanted effects on inflation or on economic agents’ financial positions in dollarised 
economies. Thus, in Brazil the dollar swap programme launched in the summer of 2013 
was extended to end-2014, and in Peru the habitual policy of intervention on the spot 
market was maintained. Colombia, by contrast, retained its reserves-purchase programme, 
for a limited amount. In any event, these economies’ indicators of external vulnerability 
Country Target December Ful??lment March Expectations (a) Expectations (a)
Brazil 4,5 ± 2 5.9 Yes 6.2  6.0 5.6
Mexico 3 ± 1 4.0 Yes 3.8  4.1 3.5
Chile 3 ± 1 3.0 Yes 3.5  3.1 3.0
Colombia 3 ± 1 1.9 Yes 2.5  3.1 3.1
Peru 2 ± 1 2.9 Yes 3.4  2.7 2.6
2013 2014 2015
INFLATION 
Year-on-year rates of change 
TABLE 2
SOURCES: National statistics and Consensus Forecasts.
a March 2013 Consensus Forecasts for the end of the year.
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remain robust, their level of foreign reserves is appropriate and the ratio of reserves to 
short-term external debt is manageable (see Box 2). 
Venezuela and Argentina are worthy of mention, since their respective levels of inflation, 
the highest in the region, have risen to highs in recent years, pushed by heavy currency 
depreciations. In the case of Venezuela, escalating prices reflect the widespread shortage 
of products – since the decline in currency reserves constrains imports – and the 
monetisation of the growing fiscal deficit. Faced with this situation, the policy response 
has been to create a system of multiple exchange rates which entails a strong devaluation 
of the currency and which in any event brings about only temporary relief to public finances, 
but progress in other areas has not been announced. In Argentina’s case, steps towards 
correcting the exchange rate overvaluation take the form of a broader re-gearing of 
economic policy. The measures adopted by the economic authorities in Argentina and 
Venezuela are detailed in the section on economic developments by country. 
Turning to fiscal policy, there was a widespread fall in revenue in 2013, derived from the 
cyclical slowdown in the region and from lower commodities-related receipts, whereas 
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BOX 2THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY IN THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO
During the latest bouts of turmoil, the emerging economies 
perceived as more vulnerable due to their larger macroeconomic 
imbalances were the hardest hit (see Chart 1). Contributing to this 
were, depending on the cases, the greater depth of their financial 
markets, the sharp appreciation of their currencies and the capital 
inflows received in the past expansionary phase.1 Brazil has been 
one of the countries showing highest volatility. Moreover, its rating 
SOURCES: IBGE, Ministério da Fazenda, Banco Central do Brasil, Datastream, IPEA and Banco de España.
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BOX 2THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY IN THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO (cont’d)
has recently been revised downward by the credit rating agency 
S&P. Although the Brazilian economy has significant economic 
imbalances, it also has the means to mitigate the effects of a less 
favourable economic and financial environment. This Box assesses 
the strengths and weaknesses of the Brazilian economy in the 
current economic scenario.
From 2003 Brazil saw a stage of sustained economic growth 
underpinned by the commodity boom. Simultaneously, 
institutional reforms were adopted and economic policy 
frameworks were strengthened to underpin macroeconomic 
stability. This enabled Brazil to confront the recent global crisis 
with sufficient latitude to adopt decidedly counter-cyclical 
policies (in some cases based on a more active role of the public 
sector) and navigate it with notable buoyancy (see  Chart 2). 
However, this also contributed to create excessive growth 
expectations. During the years of expansion, Brazil has barely 
progressed in introducing the structural reforms needed to raise 
productivity, such as developing infrastructure or simplifying its 
tax system and bureaucracy,2 a failing which has not helped to 
reduce its traditional supply rigidities and has constrained its 
investment ratio, which has remained among the lowest in the 
region (18% of GDP). When in 2011 activity cooled unexpectedly 
and certain imbalances (inflation and the external and fiscal 
deficits) widened, structural rigidities surfaced, prompting a 
revision of growth expectations. Thus, for example, the IMF, in its 
latest regular analysis of Brazil (Article IV) lowered potential 
growth to 3.5%.
The external deficit is perceived by investors as another source of 
vulnerability, against a background trend of tightening global 
financial conditions. The current account balance of Brazil has 
deteriorated since 2008 to a deficit of -3.6% of GDP in 2013 (see 
Chart 3), leaving behind the times of surplus. This development is 
explained in part by the world economic slowdown and the 
worsening terms of trade, but it also reflects Brazil’s loss of 
competitiveness related to its strong exchange rate,3 growing 
labour costs4 and low productivity increases.5 In the short term, 
the depreciation of the real will be the main source of gains in the 
economy’s competitiveness which will act as a cushion against 
the moderating domestic demand, although they are unable to 
replace the supply policies needed to boost competitiveness and 
growth potential.
The scant progress in the area of structural reforms has eroded 
investor sentiment towards Brazil. In general, there has been a 
certain tendency to expand the role of the State in the economy, 
timidity in implementing deregulatory policies and a certain 
relaxation in compliance with macroeconomic objectives. Inflation 
remains at around 6%, 1.5 pp above the central target, despite the 
fact that the economy has been growing at below potential for 
three years and the primary fiscal surplus fell from 3.1% to 1.9% 
of GDP between 2011 and 2013, thus failing to meet the 
government’s target. Monetary policy had to be tightened (the 
Selic rate rose by 375 bp to 11% between April 2013 and April 
2014), given the highly entrenched inflation with upside risk. By 
contrast, fiscal policy and directed credit have been expansionary 
(see Chart 4). Although the government plans a neutral fiscal 
policy for 2014 (primary surplus target of 1.9% of GDP) and a 
moderation of public credit, the fact that it coincides with an 
electoral year poses doubts as to whether these objectives will be 
met (thus the credit rating agencies signal the fiscal situation as 
one of the main factors of risk).
Bank credit to the private sector grew at an annual average rate of 
21% between 2004 and 2013, underpinned by the macroeconomic 
stability, the lower cost of borrowing, steady employment growth 
and a policy of promoting directed credit through government-
owned banks. This growth favoured the financial deepening of the 
economy, although in some segments the pace has been overly 
rapid. Private agents’ ability to pay, eroded by the high interest 
rates (near 30% for open-market credit) and short average 
maturities may be further weakened by the tightening of financial 
conditions. There are, however, factors which moderate this 
source of risk: the stock of credit is low (54% of GDP), especially 
in the case of mortgage credit (6% of GDP); the banking system is 
well capitalised (solvency ratio of 15%) with sizeable provisions 
(coverage ratio of 1.5) and moderate non-performing loans (3.6%); 
and macro-prudential policy is active and strict.
In any event, the Brazilian economy has significant strengths 
which mitigate many of the risks mentioned above. The economic 
policy framework is a strength despite its recent deterioration, with 
a central bank whose objective is inflation control, a flexible 
exchange rate and adherence to a law of fiscal responsibility. Also, 
government debt now has a more sustainable structure (see Chart 
5), with only a small proportion denominated in foreign currency 
(4.7% of the total in 2013) and an average maturity of 4.4 years. 
This improvement has mitigated exchange and interest rate risk, 
easing the constraints on monetary policy conduct, previously 
limited by the high weight of short-term debt denominated in 
foreign currency. The stock of foreign reserves means that net 
government debt is low (35% of GDP); indeed, the public sector 
has a net creditor position in foreign currency, so depreciation 
reduces the stock of net debt.
Additionally, Brazil’s lower external vulnerability than in the past 
(see Chart 6) reduces the probability of a balance of payments 
crisis like those seen in previous periods (1998-2002). Firstly, the 
current-account deficit is financed basically through foreign direct 
investment, which is a stable source of finance, although the 
recent increase in the external deficit has weakened that ratio 
somewhat. As a result of that form of financing, the Brazilian 
2  See FMI (2013), Article IV and Selected Issues, Brazil, July.
3  See World Bank (2013), Latin America`s Deceleration and the Exchange 
Rate Buffer, Semiannual Report, October.
4  See OECD (2013), Economic Review, Brazil, August.
5  See S. Sosa, E. Tsounta and H.S. Kim (2013), Is the Growth Momentum 
in Latin America Sustainable? IMF Working Paper/13/109.
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BOX 2THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY IN THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO (cont’d)
economy maintains its net debtor position vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world at manageable levels (14% of GDP). Most of the external 
liabilities are from direct investment (46%), a percentage which 
has increased significantly since 2002 at the expense of other 
investment; moreover, they are mostly (70%) denominated in local 
currency. Secondly, external reserves represent 17% of GDP, 
equivalent to more than a year of imports. Finally, the gross 
external debt has fallen by half in the past decade to 15% of GDP, 
with a scant weight of short-term debt (10% of the total). For all 
these reasons, the sustainability of Brazil’s external debt, as 
measured by the ratios to external reserves or exports, has 
improved, facilitating the access of the sovereign to the 
international financial markets.
In short, although the Brazilian economy has certain fragilities which 
make it vulnerable to fresh bouts of turmoil in the markets (structural 
deficiencies, high external deficit, high credit growth), it also has 
significant buffers with which to hold them in check and prevent a 
disproportionate impact on economic activity and financial stability. 
Nevertheless, the constraints on growth are palpable and will make 
it difficult for the economy to grow sustainedly and robustly in the 
coming years unless new structural reforms are introduced.
expenditure is holding at robust growth rates (see Chart 11). This has seen several 
economies, Peru and Colombia among them, joining others who were already experiencing 
a downturn in their fiscal balances. In Brazil, fiscal policy has maintained the expansionary 
stance of recent years, amplified by a directed credit-boosting policy, while budgetary 
targets have failed to be met, despite undergoing interim revisions. This is one of the 
reasons behind the recent credit downgrade, which highlights the tightness of fiscal 
margins. In 2014, the government foresees a neutral stance, with a stable primary surplus 
at 1.9% of GDP. Mexico met its fiscal target, with a deficit of 2.3% of GDP. Fiscal policy will 
be more expansionary in 2014, albeit remaining within the parameters of the new fiscal rule.
As in the preceding months, regional integration processes advanced at different paces 
depending on whether analysis is made of the group of countries more oriented to the 
Pacific, with greater progress, or the Southern Cone. Globally, the trend towards greater 
trade liberalisation is becoming entrenched, as reflected in the first multilateral agreement 
reached since 1995 – at the WTO Summit in Bali – and on the progress, albeit with 
difficulties, in the negotiations for multinational agreements such as the Transpacific 
Partnership or the agreement between the United States and the European Union. Against 
this background, the protocol for the liberalisation of trade among the Pacific Alliance 
countries (Colombia, Peru, Chile and Mexico), which neutralises tariffs for 92% of trade, 
was finally signed in February 2014. At the same time, negotiations began or free trade 
agreements were approved with other markets, such as Turkey (Peru), Thailand (Peru and 
Colombia) and Panama (Mexico and Colombia). The MERCOSUR countries appear to 
continue to be standing on the sidelines of these tendencies. The political dispute over 
Venezuelan membership and Paraguay’s suspension were the focus of attention in the 
half-year period, and the submission of offers to resume negotiations of the treaty with the 
European Union was postponed, owing essentially to the low coverage of products 
susceptible to liberalisation offered by Argentina. That gave rise to tensions within the 
group, since Brazil and Uruguay once again called for the obligation to negotiate 
agreements en bloc to be made null and void. Finally, mention should be made of the 
progress in negotiations between the EU and Ecuador to sign a co-operation treaty. 
As regards structural reforms, Mexico approved a fiscal reform (of somewhat less breadth 
than expected, but which includes a structural fiscal rule) in late 2013, and an energy 
Trade and reform
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sector reform, which proved more ambitious than initially planned, as well as being in line 
with the main recommendations by multilateral agencies. In the case of Peru, a reform of 
fiscal accountability legislation was approved, in order to make it more structural. In Chile, 
the change in government entailed the creation of new welfare benefits, and a tax reform 
was announced with a view to it funding educational reform. In Argentina, the dispute 
between the government and Repsol over the expropriation of YPF was resolved, and a 
price indicator more in step with IMF recommendations began to be published.
In Brazil, GDP in Q4 surprised on the upside, growing at a quarterly rate of 0.7% after 
falling by 0.5%. But the recovery continues at a slow pace, with year-on-year growth of 
1.9% in Q4, down from 2.2% the previous quarter. Indeed, in 2013 as a whole, the economy 
grew by 2.3% (1% in 2012), below expectations at the start of the year. In terms of demand 
components, the higher growth in 2013 is attributable to the rise in investment, which grew 
by 6.3%. Both private and government consumption slowed on the previous year, affected 
by high inflation, lower confidence, high financing costs and lower growth in consumer 
credit. External demand made a negative contribution in 2013 as a whole (-0.9 pp), given 
the greater buoyancy of imports (driven by the improvement in investment) relative to 
exports which, in any event, picked up in the second half, assisted by the depreciation of 
the real. Despite easing somewhat since June, inflation held at a high level (6.2% year-on-
year in March), with upside risks. This derived from the strong cumulative depreciation 
over the past year, which was by more than 11% against the dollar and might prove 
persistent, and the possible reduction in subsidies to certain regulated products. Free-
market lending slowed appreciably, especially consumer credit, although total credit 
retained its dynamism owing to the boom in directed credit. Against this backdrop, the 
central bank, having changed the bias in its policy in April 2013, implemented rises in 
official rates totalling 375 bp, up to 11% in April, although at the past two meetings the 
pace of increases has eased to 25 bp. The current account deficit widened considerably 
to 3.7% of GDP in 2013 as a result of the trade surplus being practically wiped out. The 
primary surplus for the public sector dipped to 1.9% of GDP, the worst figure since 2001 
(see Chart 11). In 2014, the primary surplus target, which was initially set at 2.1% of GDP, 
fell to 1.9%, which implies a more neutral fiscal policy stance compared with the 
expansionary one of previous years. However, in April Standard & Poor´s downgraded 
Brazil’s sovereign debt rating (the country’s first downgrade since 2002), owing to low 
growth, to the cumulative deterioration in the external accounts and public finances, and 
to doubts over the consistency of fiscal policy and its limited margin for manoeuvre in the 
face of external shocks. The high-frequency indicators were more positive in early 2014, 
although they have not yet become entrenched. What is anticipated in some change in the 
composition of growth, with a greater contribution by external demand, assisted by the 
depreciation of the exchange rate and an easing in domestic demand. 
In Mexico, GDP expanded by 1.1% in 2013, compared with 3.9% in 2012. The figure was 
far lower than expected at the start of the year, apparently as a consequence of several 
temporary factors: the relative weakness of the US recovery (especially in the first half of 
the year), the decline in the construction industry and the delay in implementing public 
spending derived from the new incoming administration. The contribution of external 
demand turned positive in the second half of the year (1.5 pp on average) in light of the 
strong moderation in imports and the marked pick-up in exports in Q4 (6.7% year-on-
year). A pick-up in the economy is expected in 2014, given the momentum of economic 
policy and the improvement in external conditions, although the indicators at the beginning 
of the year have been mixed, and the rise is estimated to take place from Q2. Inflation 
increased from October, owing to supply-side factors. Adding to these in January was the 
Economic developments 
by country
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2014 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY: FIRST HALF OF 2014
effect of the fiscal reform, which took inflation in March to a year-on-year rate of 3.8%, 
slightly below the upper limits of the target range. However, the underlying rate has held at 
historical lows (2.9 % in March) and inflation expectations remain anchored. The peso has 
depreciated by 7.7% over the past year, less than other currencies in the region despite 
the lack of intervention on the foreign exchange market. Against this background, the 
central bank cut official interest rates by 25 bp in September and October, holding them 
since at 3.5%. On the fiscal front, the deficit target of 2.3% of GDP in 2013 was met 
(considering PEMEX investment). For 2014, a bigger stimulus is envisaged, with a deficit 
close to 3.5% owing to increases in spending on infrastructure and social security. The 
current account balance for 2013 as a whole posted a deficit equivalent to 1.8% of GDP, 
a notable deterioration on the previous year (-0.7%), due in part to the trade balance, 
which went from surplus into deficit. In any event, the external imbalance remains covered 
in its entirety by FDI, which has broken the declining trend of recent years. Finally, the 
government approved two major new reforms, in the fiscal area and in the energy sector. 
The first was somewhat less ambitious than foreseen, given that it did not alter the VAT tax 
bases and left certain sectors outside this tax. It did, however, harmonise tax rates across 
export-geared sectors and others, and it increased the State tax-raising capacity by 
around 1 pp of GDP. Furthermore, a new fiscal rule was approved to correct the procyclical 
bias of the current balanced-budget rule, setting a ceiling on spending and allowing 
slippage from the equilibrium level if GDP grows below potential. In the case of the energy 
reform, which was more ambitious than expected, private-sector participation is permitted 
at all stages of hydrocarbons production, which augurs a strong increase in foreign direct 
investment over the coming years; a sovereign wealth fund has been created (with the oil 
revenue remaining after attending to the maintenance of certain public spending ratios); 
and the electricity sector is opened up to private-sector participation. Thanks largely to 
these advances, an upgrading of sovereign debt was announced by Standard and Poor’s 
(to BBB+) and, subsequently, by Moody’s (to A3). 
Although activity in Argentina regained greater momentum in 2013, it weakened noticeably 
in the second half. Growth was 3% in 2013, a figure incorporating a methodological 
change that prevents its comparison with previous data. In terms of components, private 
consumption was the driving force, assisted by public policies, the increase in lending to 
the private sector (by around 30% year-on-year) and a relatively sound labour market (the 
unemployment rate fell to 6.4%, albeit with less job creation and lower growth in real 
wages). Investment eased in the second half, despite construction picking up. But the key 
characteristic of 2013 was the heightening of the pressures on the balance of payments. 
Thus, despite capital controls, there was a growing outflow of currency through the current 
account, which posted a deficit of 0.9% of GDP, with a high tourism deficits adding to the 
rising energy deficit. These dynamics, in the context of exchange-rate intervention, 
resulted in a heavy absorption of external reserves. In these circumstances, there has 
been something of a shift in economic policy since last November, initially with the aim of 
checking the decline in currency reserves. The pace of depreciation of the peso increased 
strongly, up to 6.2% in December, compared with a monthly rate of 1.5% during the first 
half of the year. Further, quotas on certain imports were increased and an attempt was 
made to reduce the premium on the parallel exchange rate, through the sale of dollar-
denominated bonds by State agencies. Nonetheless, during the first two weeks of January, 
the downturn in reserves accelerated, resulting in further economic measures. Thus, on 22 
January the authorities ceased to intervene on the foreign exchange market for two days, 
prompting a depreciation of 16% (to 8.01 pesos per dollar, see Chart 12), while uncertainty 
took the premium on the parallel exchange rate to 70%. Subsequently, in an attempt to 
restore confidence, capital controls were eased for individuals, who were allowed to 
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purchase dollars for saving purposes, with certain restrictions. At the same time, the 
interest rates on pesos were raised (by 900 bp) and sterilisation increased, with a rise in 
reserve requirements. More recently, a reduction in energy subsidies has been announced 
in an attempt to contain fiscal worsening. As a result of these measures, the exchange rate 
has stabilised at around 8 pesos per dollar, the premium on the parallel rate has fallen and 
the decline in reserves has been checked, although a regulatory change that obliged the 
banking system to reduce its position in dollars also contributed here. Despite the fact that 
the measures implemented are steps in the right direction, the short-term outlook is 
uncertain. According to the new indicator, cumulative inflation in the first two months of 
2014 is estimated to have increased by 7.2%. Over the course of 2013, the primary deficit 
amounted to 3% of GDP. Finally, Argentina has made progress in recent months in 
normalising its external relations, reaching agreements with litigating private corporations, 
commencing negotiations with the Paris Club and improving relations with the IMF. This 
change may be conducive to the opening up of certain foreign funding facilities and attract 
foreign investment to the oil sector. In any event, a difficult fiscal adjustment lies ahead, 
without which recent reforms may prove insufficient, and without it being possible to rule 
out second-round effects on wages in these circumstances. 
In Chile, the pace of growth eased in 2013. This was especially so in Q4, when it posted a 
quarterly decline of 0.1%, resulting in a marked year-on-year slowdown to 2.7%. Over the 
course of 2013 growth was 4.1%, compared with 5.4% in 2012, with a slowdown in 
domestic demand to 3.4%. Contributing particularly to this was investment, with a rise of 
only 0.4% (in Q4 this variable even fell by 12.3%). Hence, compounding the strong 
correction in investment in machinery and equipment, against the background of the 
levelling off of mining investment, was the unexpected stagnation of construction. 
Meantime, though moving on a mildly slowing trend, consumption continued to be a 
mainstay, growing by 5.4% (4.6% in Q4), thanks to the favourable labour market conditions. 
Specifically, the unemployment rate remains at a low (6%) and real wages increased by 
3%. Government consumption also exerted a positive influence, albeit to a lesser extent, 
after increasing by 4.2% over the year, although it eased in the final quarter. The contribution 
of external demand turned positive (0.6 pp), given the adjustment on imports and some 
pick-up in exports, which increased by 4.3%. The balance of payments posted a slight 
downturn in the trade surplus, despite which the current account deficit stabilised at 3.4% 
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of GDP, comfortably financed by FDI flows. Inflation, which had remained contained, has 
risen in recent months in the face of supply-side shocks in food and energy. In March it 
stood at 3.5%, somewhat above its central target. Underlying inflation has also risen, to 
2.9%, evidencing some pass-through due to the depreciation of the peso (see Chart 12). 
The central bank began last October to pursue an expansionary monetary policy, having 
made four 25 bp cuts to the official rate to date, to 4%. At the fiscal level, strong moderation 
in spending at the end of the year enabled, despite lower revenue, an effective fiscal deficit 
of 0.6% of GDP and a structural deficit of 0.7% of GDP, above-target, to be recorded in 
2013. As a result, the 2014 target of a structural deficit of 1% of GDP along with higher 
structural revenue attributable to the depreciation should provide for an expansion in 
public spending, thereby exerting some momentum. Despite this factor, growth in 2014 
will ease. The main risk is associated with the possibility that a slowdown and change in 
the pattern of growth in China may entail a further decline in the price of copper, which 
would have adverse effects on growth and on the external and fiscal accounts. The draft 
tax reform includes a progressive rise in taxes on corporations, a reduction in the maximum 
personal income tax rate and some rises in indirect taxes. The reform is expected gradually 
to raise revenue by 3 pp of GDP, with an increase of 0.3% of GDP in 2014, with the aim of 
financing educational reform. 
In Colombia, GDP grew by 4.3% in 2013 as a whole, marginally up on 4% in 2012. The 
pace of expansion quickened throughout the year. This greater dynamism was underpinned 
by investment in civil engineering works. However, investment in capital goods remained 
sluggish, with the industrial sector recovering at a slower pace than expected. Final 
consumption quickened to 4.9% in Q4 (4.7% for the year) thanks to an equivalent increase 
in private consumption, driven by greater job creation and by the cuts to the official rate in 
2013. The contribution of external demand to growth turned positive in 2013 (0.3 pp), as 
the increase in exports (5.3%) outpaced that in imports (2.1%), owing to the weakness of 
investment in capital goods and the exchange rate depreciation (9.2% over the past year). 
The high-frequency indicators point to growth remaining buoyant and potentially more 
balanced, against the backdrop of the expected recovery in exports and in non-residential 
private investment. Despite the depreciation, inflation continued to surprise on the 
downside (2.5% year-on-year in March), which might denote that the output gap, following 
the increase in investment in recent years, could remain negative. In this setting, the central 
SOURCES: National central banks and Datastream. 
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bank has kept the official rate at 3.25% since last April and extended its dollar purchase 
programme at least until next June. On the fiscal front, the target of holding the structural 
deficit on a declining path was met, with a figure of 2.4% of GDP being recorded. The 
current account deficit widened to around 3% of GDP, reflecting an increase in the rate of 
investment. Colombia is not among the countries most affected by the current bout of 
tension on the emerging markets, maintaining net portfolio investment inflows. Further, the 
Government is considering reducing the withholding tax on foreign bondholders, seeking 
to increase their participation in the local market. Lastly, Fitch raised Colombia’s long-term 
sovereign foreign currency rating to BBB.
In Peru, activity regained greater momentum in the second half of the year, especially in 
Q4, when GDP posted quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year rates of growth of 1.4% and 
5.1%, respectively. Even so, growth for the year as a whole (5%) was down on the previous 
year (6.3%). In terms of components, private consumption remained very dynamic, 
growing by 5.2% in 2013 in a setting in which the labour market remains robust. By 
contrast, investment increased more slowly than expected, growing by 5.9% in 2013 
(1.8% in Q4), much less than in 2012 (14.8%). The contribution of external demand turned 
slightly positive in the second half of the year (although over the year as a whole it 
subtracted 1 pp), as a result of the more marked easing in imports than in exports. The 
current account deficit widened notably in 2013, to 4.9% of GDP, owing to the deterioration 
in the trade balance. This high current account deficit, though it could be a factor of 
vulnerability, reflects the increase in the investment ratio, financed by long-term capital 
and chiefly aimed at the tradeables (mining) sector. Inflation, after having stood within its 
target range in the second half of 2013, quickened more recently to 3.4% in March. Core 
inflation also stood above its target. The central bank has kept its official rate unchanged, 
excepting a surprise 25 bp cut in November to 4%. Conversely, it has sought to ease 
monetary conditions by means of reductions in the local currency reserve requirements, to 
offset intervention on the foreign exchange market in defence of the sol. On the fiscal front, 
the public sector posted a primary surplus in 2013 equivalent to 2.3% of GDP, markedly 
worse owing to a much bigger increase in expenditure than in revenue. Fitch raised its 
credit rating of Peru’s foreign-currency-denominated debt to BBB+ and that in local 
currency to A–. With a view to 2014, the indicators of activity and confidence show greater 
momentum, partly due to the better performance of the primary sectors, which should be 
conducive to somewhat higher growth than in 2013.
In Venezuela, the economy retained the sluggishness shown during the first half of the year. 
After growing by 5.6% in 2012, and although it has not officially released the figures for Q4, 
it was announced that GDP grew by 1.6% in 2013. In terms of components, this slowdown 
is attributable to the strong correction in investment, against a backdrop of collapsing 
imports, as a result of the shortage of foreign currency and of the fall-off in public investment. 
Private and government consumption remain the most dynamic components, albeit tending 
to slow, owing to the moderation of credit and to a labour market where, despite 
unemployment holding at 7.5%, wages underwent a notable loss in purchasing power for 
the second year running. Inflation surged above 50% towards the end of the year, driven by 
a lower official distribution of currency for imports, a very strong increase in the money 
supply due to the funding of public entities (see Chart 14) and a depreciation of the black 
market exchange rate, with the depletion indicator standing at a high. The government’s 
response was to increase price controls, passing legislation on fair prices, which sets 
ceilings for increases in prices and profits. To alleviate the currency constraint, the 
government set in train a new dollar tender system (SICAD I) last July, under which currency 
is delivered to importers at lower exchange rates than the official parity (42%); finally, in 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 42 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2014 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY: FIRST HALF OF 2014
March 2014 a new parallel market – SICAD  II – was created. In principle, this makes the 
exchange controls in force in the country since 2003 more flexible, allowing for trading in 
currency, both in cash and in government bonds issued to the private sector, which may 
retain a greater portion of its export revenues to route them to this market. The exchange 
rate on this new market stood close to that of the parallel market (52 bolivars per dollar, 
87.9% below the parity for preferential imports). This heavy devaluation will impact the 
inflation rate but, conversely, it will ease the State’s budgetary constraint and reduce 
pressure on the central bank’s currency reserves, which fell once more during the six-
month period and stood below the maturities of external debt scheduled for 2014. At the 
same time, the opening up of this new market might reduce the level of shortages insofar 
as it provides swifter access to the foreign currency needed for imports. The rating agencies 
downgraded the country’s sovereign rating in December and once again in March. 
14.4.2014.
SOURCE: Banco Central de Venezuela. 
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